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main purpose of this chapter is to measure the imbalance between the concessions given
and those received by Argentina in these negotiations. I conclude that the value of the
concessions given has been far greater than the value of the concessions that Argentina
received. Other subjects discussed in this chapter include an analysis of the economic
consequences of this imbalance and the prospects for Argentina in a new multilateral
round.
The ﬁrst message I want to convey is that although there are several factors explaining
the unbalanced outcome, Argentina’s weak negotiating strategy was an important ele-
ment. The evidence from Doha indicates that the leadership has not yet understood this
point, and the economic analysis presented in this chapter indicates that the costs of a
weak negotiating strategy are very high.
The second lesson is that protectionism increases the degree of incoherence between
the multilateral trading system and the international ﬁnancial system in ways that have
so far not been studied in depth. The analysis presented here indicates that by reducing
the exports of efﬁcient producers, agricultural protectionism worsens their solvency
indicators. This in turn, increases the level of country risk and the structure of domestic
interest rates, therefore slowing growth and the capacity to service debt.
The chapter is organized as follows. Part II presents a brief description of Argentina’s
long-run trade performance as well as its role in the multilateral system prior to the
Uruguay Round. Part III provides a quantitative measurement of the value of the conces-
sions given and concessions received in the Uruguay Round negotiations, while Part IV
analyses the economic effects of this imbalance. Part V offers a preliminary discussion
of the interests of Argentina in ongoing regional trade negotiations, particularly between
MERCOSUR and the EU. Part VI includes a discussion of the prospects for Argentina
in a new round. Finally, I present brief concluding remarks.
II. The Role of Argentina in International Trade and in the GATT
At the start of the twentieth century Argentina was an active participant in the globaliza-
tion process that was taking place at the time. The economic crisis of the 1930s put an
end to this process. The crisis was deepened by the infamous U.S. Smoot-Hawley Tariff
Act of 1930, and world trade is estimated to have fallen by around sixty percent between
1929 and 1933.1
Argentina suffered the consequences of this crisis, and like other countries, erected
high barriers to imports. Unlike many other countries, however, it continued to remain
inward-oriented for many decades after the Second World War.2 Domestically, this ide-
ology and its associated policies were fueled by economic theory and by rent-seeking
groups,includingtheexpandingmilitary-industrialcomplex.Withrespecttoeconomics,
the trade policies of Argentina and most Latin American economies were inﬂuenced for
decades by Raoul Prebisch’s famous theories of import-substitution and the secular de-
cline of the terms of trade of primary commodity exporting countries. After World War
II, their own domestic policies, coupled with the increasing agricultural protectionism of
1 JAGDISH BHAGWATI,P ROTECTIONISM 21 (1990).
2 See for example the excellent work by CARLOS DIAZ ALEJANDRO,E SSAYS ON THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF
THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC (1970).P1: FAW/FAW P2: FAW






























Figure 1: Trade Output Rations in a Sample of Countries, 1999
Source: Author’s elaboration based on World Bank data.
the richer countries, meant that Latin American countries remained quite marginalized
from international trade ﬂows. This is one of the most important factors explaining the
relatively poor growth performance of the region during the last thirty years.
Argentina’strade-outputratio(ratioofexportsplusimportsofgoodstoGDP)declined
dramatically as a result of the drastic shift in its trade policies. Thus, while the ratio
ﬂuctuated between 35 percent and 45 percent during the 1920s, by the late 1940s it had
declined to ﬁfteen percent. From then until the end of the 1980s (in which decade the
Governmentimplementedthemostprotectionistpoliciesforyears),thetrade-outputratio
ﬂuctuated around ten percent.
Inward-looking policies isolated Argentina from the growth of international trade that
began in the late 1940s when the GATT was created.3 Argentina was admitted to the
GATT in 1967, but it was not an active participant in the Tokyo Round of multilateral
trade negotiations that took place in the 1970s. For example, Argentina had bound only
seventeen percent of its tariff lines prior to the Uruguay Round.4
As a consequence of its inward-looking policies and accompanying trade-distorting
measures, such as the nationalization of public service companies and increasing ﬁscal
deﬁcits, Argentina lost competitiveness and its long-run potential growth rate declined.
Fore xample, while the per capita income gap between Argentina and the the richest
country at that time (the United Kingdom) in 1900 was forty percent, the difference, this
time with the United States, had widened to seventy percent by 1999.
Argentina remains a marginal player in international trade despite the fact that several
yearsagoitcompletedanimportantreductionoftradebarriersinitiatedinthelate1980s.
Figure 1 shows that the trade-output ratios of Argentina and Brazil are the lowest in a
sample of countries. This occurred in spite of the fact that Argentina’s reform policies
led to a doubling of the value of its exports during the 1990s.5
III. The Uruguay Round Negotiations
Both the preamble to the GATT and Article XXVIII bis of the Agreement state that
multilateral trade negotiations should be conducted “...on a reciprocal and mutually
advantageous basis...”. I show in this part shows that the results of the Uruguay Round
3 Foradiscussion of the early years of the GATT and the trade liberalization it led to, see Bhagwati, supra,
note 1.
4 MICHAEL J. FINGER,M ERLINDA INGCO AND ULRICH REINCKE,T HE URUGUAY ROUND:S TATISTICS ON TARIFF
CONCESSIONS GIVEN AND RECEIVED 24 (1996).
5 It should be said that after the 2002 devaluation, Argentina’s dollar-based GDP has fallen, which in turn
implies an increase of the trade-output ratio. Eight months after the devaluation, the country is still adjusting
to the crisis; in this period exports have declined by eight percent and imports by a staggering sixty percent.
Therefore it is still risky to say where the new equilibrium will lie after the adjustment has been completed.P1: FAW/FAW P2: FAW
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(“UR”) for Argentina are clearly unbalanced in that the concessions it gave to its trading
partners,particularlyOECDcountries,faroutweighthoseitreceivedfromthem.Idothis
by quantifying the economic value of concessions in intellectual property, in services,
and in trade in goods.
Argentina is not alone. For many developing countries the UR did not result in a
balanced exchange of concessions.6 Why did this occur and what are the consequences?
I believe that one of the underlying reasons for this outcome in the case of Argentina




developing countries to bind concessions against their will. These forces also explain
part of the unbalanced outcome.
In quantifying the balance, I start by looking at the concessions given by developing
countrieswithrespecttointellectualpropertyrightsandtradeinservices,andthendiscuss
the concessions given and received with respect to trade in goods.
A. Intellectual Property Rights: The Case of Patents for Pharmaceutical Drugs
Despite the resistance of some developing countries, the industrialized countries had
sufﬁcient negotiating power to include intellectual property rights in the UR, a new
subject which resulted in the Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights
(“TRIPS”). As a result, there is now under way a policy reform process that is increasing
thestrengthofintellectualpropertyrights(“IPRs”)inmanydevelopingcountriestoalevel
that is closer to the standards of the industrialized countries. This has occurred despite
the lack of any theoretical or empirical analysis to show that policy reforms induced
by the TRIPS will increase world welfare, or the welfare of developing countries.7 Why
did this occur? What will be the impact on Argentina?
1. Rent-Seeking by Pharmaceutical Drug Companies
One of the main reasons why the patent section of the TRIPS takes the form that it
does can be traced to the power of rent-seeking groups associated with certain forms
of innovation and their intellectual protection, including pharmaceutical drugs.8 Given
the size of the pharmaceutical market and the economic interests at stake, I concentrate
my remarks on the impact of TRIPS on this sector.9 Also, for other forms of IPRs
such as trademarks and copyrights, the differences in views between industrialized and
developing countries on what should be the length and strength of protection are not as
signiﬁcant as they are in the case of pharmaceutical drugs. What was the strategy of the
international pharmaceutical drug companies that enabled them to impose their patent
policies on developing countries?
6 Michael J. Finger and Julio J. Nogu´ es, The Unbalanced Uruguay Outcome: The New Areas in Future WTO
Negotiations, 25(3) THE WORLD ECONOMY 321 (2002).
7 ∗∗See, in this respect, Chapter of this book (Correa).
8 As I show below, pharmaceutical drug markets in several developing countries generate signiﬁcant rents.
9 The pharmaceutical industry is one of the few industries for which patent protection is critical as an
incentive for investing in R&D. Pharmaceutical drug companies have one of the highest ratios of R&D to
sales and most drug products can be easily copied. Patents are less signiﬁcant in many other industries in
whichtheincentivestoinnovateareessentiallymarket-based,suchasbeingtheﬁrsttomarket.RichardLevin,
Richard, Alvin Klevorick, Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter, Appropriating the Returns from Industrial
Research and Development, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, No. 3 (1987).P1: FAW/FAW P2: FAW
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In March, 1987, only a few months after the UR had been launched, Gerald
Mossinghoff, then President of the US Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association
(“PMA”), declared that the Association was working with the U.S. Congress to get it
to enact “...the intellectual property revisions of the Omnibus Trade Bill that would
strengthen the hand of the U.S. Government in urging all our trading partners to respect
our rights in inventions and trademarks....”10 Soon afterwards, the U.S. Congress en-
acted the Omnibus Trade Act of 1988, which among other things amended Section 301
of the 1974 Trade Act so as to make it easier to impose retaliatory trade measures with
respect to practices of foreign governments that are “unjustiﬁable ...unreasonable or
discriminatory” and which burden or restrict US commerce.11
The law provides that failure to provide fair and equitable IPR protection is a form
of “unreasonable” practice.12 At the request of the PMA, supported now by the newly
strengthened hand of the U.S. Government, the U.S. Trade Representative (“USTR”)
initiated a series of actions against developing countries that did not provide patent
protection for pharmaceutical drugs, including Argentina, Brazil, Korea, and India. At
thetime,accordingtotheWorldIntellectualPropertyOrganization,forty-eightcountries,
most of them developing, did not provide patent protection for pharmaceutical drugs.13
ThePMAandtheUSTRthereforehadfertilegroundonwhichtodeploythestrengthened
Section 301, and they worked enthusiastically to force developing countries to enact
patent protection for pharmaceutical drugs.14
Even in the United States, the degree of support for the patent system has ﬂuctuated
over time.15 During the 1980s the U.S. Government favored strong IPR protection. The
pharmaceutical industry took advantage of this, ﬁrst by obtaining reform of domestic
patent law, and then by moving aggressively towards forcing developing countries to
introducepatentlegislationortoreformtheirexistinglaws.16 Clearly,theindustrywould
nothadbeenabletopushassuccessfullyatotherpointsintimeasitdidinthe1980s,and
10 Gerald Mossinghoff, Public Policy Challenges to the Pharmaceutical Industry, PHARMACEUTICAL MANU-
FACTURERS ASSOCIATION REVIEW (1987).
11 Section 301(a) and (b) of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, 19 U.S.C. §2411(a) and (b).
12 Id.,Section 301(d)(3)(B)(i)(II), 19 U.S.C. §301(d)(3)(B)(i)(II).
13 World Intellectual Property Organization, Existence, Scope, and Form of Generally Internationally Ac-
cepted and Applied Standards/Norms for the Protection of Intellectual Property,W O/Inf 129, (1988).
14 Foradiscussion of these policies and their consequences, see AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM:A MERICA’S
301 TRADE POLICY AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM (Jagdish Bhagwati and Hugh Patrick eds.1990).
15 Professor Fritz Machlup, who undertook an evaluation of the patent system for the US Congress in 1958,
concluded:
“...ifone does not know whether a system as a whole (in contrast to certain features of it) is good
or bad, the safest policy conclusion is to muddle through either with it, if one has long lived with it,
or without it, if one has lived without it. If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible
on the basis of our present knowledge of its economic consequences, to recommend instituting one.
But since we have had a patent system for a long time, it would be irresponsible on the basis of our
present knowledge, to recommend abolishing it...”
Fritz Machlup, An Economic Review of the Patent System, U.S. Congress, Senate Subcommittee on
Patents, Trademarks and Copyright, Study No. 15, at 80 (1958). Patent protection for pharmaceuticals
has been a controversial subject from time to time in the United States, but those that have confronted the
PMA, such as the American Association of Retired Persons, have had limited success in protecting their
interests.
16 Note that the introduction of patents in developing countries provides rents immediately after the policy
comes into effect, while extending the patent life in industrial countries, as was done in the U.S. Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, only provides a higher level of income many years
down the road and is therefore, more uncertain.P1: FAW/FAW P2: FAW
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today some voices are beginning to argue that patent protection may now be too strong,
as witnessed by the Doha Declaration on Public Health.17
The TRIPS Agreement was drafted at about the same time as these developments, and
the patent section (Section 5) was inﬂuenced by the PMA. The proposed reforms had the
support of the EC and Japan. They were opposed by a number of developing countries,
includingBrazilandIndia,butArgentinadidnottakeaposition.Intheevent,allcontract-
ing parties to the GATT/WTO signed the WTO Agreement as a single undertaking. It of
course included the TRIPS Agreement which stipulated that patents should be available
for inventions in all ﬁelds of technology, and should last at least twenty years from the
date of ﬁling.18 Previously, the coverage and duration of patents in developing countries
varied, and was usually less than twenty years. Countries structured their IPR policies
in ways that they determined to be in their national interest. Now the policy is one of
stronger and more uniform patent protection; a policy for whose welfare consequences
there is no theoretical or empirical evidence.
Iw anttoendthesebriefcommentsonrent-seekingwithonereﬂectionfromhistory.In
the area of pharmaceutical drugs, the available evidence suggests that retaliatory threats
and retaliatory actions gained prominence in the late 1980s with the passage of the
amendments to Section 301. It is of interest to recall that before then, several industrial
countriesstilldidnotprovidepatentprotectionforpharmaceuticals.Forexample,France
only introduced patent protection for pharmaceutical drugs in 1960, Germany in 1968,
Japan in 1976, Switzerland in 1977, and Sweden and Italy in 1978. It would appear that
patentswereintroducedinthesecountrieswhenthesizeoftheirpharmaceuticalindustry
was such as to make the likelihood of drug innovation from investments in R&D high.
In other words, patents were introduced somewhere along the path of a market-based
growth process. Pharmaceutical companies in developing countries will not have the
same opportunity for innovation simply because they have not reached a size where it
becomes proﬁtable to invest in R&D in new drugs. The term applied to them is “pirates”.
Clearly, the development process of this industry in many developing countries has been
dramatically changed by the obligation to introduce levels of intellectual property that
are not adequate to their stage of development.
2. Estimating the Value of Concessions in Patents
In order to provide a rough estimate of the value of concessions in patents, the following
discussion will address the issues of rents, foreign direct investment and trade.
(a) Transfer of Rents. As already discussed, the issue of patent protection for pharma-
ceutical drugs has to do more with the question of appropriation of the rents generated
in developing countries than with concerns regarding innovation and growth potential
in these countries. Table 1 shows some economic characteristics of the pharmaceutical
drug market in several developing countries in 1988. I used these aggregate sales ﬁgures
ina1993papertoestimatetheincomegainsandrentsthatwouldaccruetomultinational
drug companies upon introduction of patent protection.19 The estimated income gains
17 WorldTradeOrganization,DeclarationontheTRIPSAgreementandPublicHealth,WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2,
(2001). The text of the Declaration appears in the Appendix 10 this book.
18 TRIPS Agreement, Articles 27 and 33.
19 Julio J.Nogu´ es, Social Costs and Beneﬁts of Introducing Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical Drugs in
Developing Countries,T HE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES,a tXXXI-1 (March 1993). See also, Arvind Subrami-
anan, Putting Some Numbers on the TRIPS Pharmaceutical Debate,1 0(2/3) INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF
TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT 252–268 (1995), for additional estimations of rent transfers.P1: FAW/FAW P2: FAW
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Table1: Sales of Patented Pharmaceutical Products in Some Developing Countries, 198869
(U.S.$ million)
Variables Argentina Brazil India Mexico Korea
1. Pharmaceutical Market
Size 1,200.0 2,000.0 4,200.0 1,000.0 1,000.0
2. Patented Pharmaceutical
Market 771.6 1,750.4 2,546.0 852.5 308.0
2.1 Sales by domestic
ﬁrms 231.0 93.8 920.0 136.5 188.0
2.2 Sales by patent
holders 540.0 1,656.6 1,626.0 716.0 120.0
3. Ratio of
(2)/(1) × 100 64.3 87.3 60.6 85.3 30.8
69 Source: JulioJ.Nogu´ es,SocialCostsandBeneﬁtsofIntroducingPatentProtectionforPharmaceutical
Drugs in Developing Countries,T HE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES,a tXXXI-1 (March 1993).
come from two sources. The ﬁrst is the assumed transfer to multinational companies of
all sales of patented drugs by domestic ﬁrms (Line 2.1 in Table 1). The second source
of income is derived from greater exploitation of the monopolistic power protected by
patents. Since there is no strong evidence on the extent to which ﬁrms in the pre-patent
situation are behaving competitively, the estimates had to rely on different assumptions
of price increases upon introduction of patents.
Additional assumptions on price-cost margins are necessary in order to go from esti-
matedincomegainstoanestimateofpurerents.Forexample,ithasbeenreportedthatfor
many years Pﬁzer sold the antibiotic Tetracycline at $30.60 per bottle of 100 capsules.20
When Pﬁzer’s patent was challenged, competing ﬁrms sold the generic product at $2.50
per bottle of 100 units. Scherer also asserts that “...many similar cases of price-cost
margins in the order of 90 percent or more for patented drugs have been identiﬁed.... ”
The market for pharmaceutical products in Argentina has grown since 1988, and sales
reached $3.4 billion dollars in 1999. Assuming that: (i) the breakdown between patented
products and the participation of foreign and domestic ﬁrms is similar to that presented
in Table 1; (ii) patents will allow greater exploitation of monopoly power resulting in a
thirty percent increase in gross sales; and (iii) the average price-cost margin of patented
drugsisﬁftypercent,thentheestimateofrentstransferredfromdomestictointernational
pharmaceutical companies would be equivalent to $425 million per year.21
These are sizable rents, though they will not all be transferred at once. One reason is
that there will be a phase-in period during which the number of patented drugs will in-
crease until reaching international levels. Another potential cushioning factor will be the
issuanceofcompulsorylicensesininstanceswhereapatentgoesunworkedforanumber
of years or where there is abuse of market position. On the other hand, the “strengthened
arm” of the U.S. Government will be used to extract the maximum monopoly proﬁts.
Fore xample in its 2000 Special 301 Report, the USTR states that ensuring “...that
developing countries are in full compliance with the [TRIPS] agreement now that the
20 FREDERICK M. SCHERER,I NDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ( 1980).
21 For details, see J. Michael Finger and Julio J. Nogu´ es, supra note 6.P1: FAW/FAW P2: FAW
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transitionperiodhascometoanendisoneoftheAdministration’shighestpriorities....”22
The Report stated that there are “...59trading partners that deny adequate and effective
protection of intellectual property or deny fair and equitable market access to United
States artists and industries that rely upon intellectual property protection”, and sixteen
of them, including Argentina, were included in the Priority Watch List.23
(b) Impact on Foreign Direct Investment and Trade. After patent legislation has been
implemented in the developing countries, international drug companies can choose to
source from plants in those countries or from their major production sites. In the latter
case, domestic production would cease, imports would increase, and employment in
the industry would decline. Evidence that reverse foreign direct investment (“FDI”) is
likely to occur comes from developing countries that have recently introduced and/or
strengthened patent protection for pharmaceutical drugs. One example is Chile, which
implemented new patent legislation in 1991, since when most foreign subsidiaries have
opted to leave the country and source from abroad.24 This is a sensitive subject on which
more research is needed.25
This evidence is in line with the view that FDI inﬂows to this industry in developing
countries were not inhibited by the lack of patent protection.26 It contradicts the opinions
of those who argue that strengthening patent protection in developing countries would
attract FDI, particularly in the chemical and pharmaceutical industries.27
To sum up, unlike the negotiations on trade in goods, the UR negotiations on patents,
particularly patents for pharmaceutical drugs, were conducted with practically no em-
pirical and theoretical analysis to support the different proposals. In this situation, it is
not surprising that many of the justiﬁcations for promoting a worldwide uniform patent
system are either non-existent, or tend to work in the opposite direction to that argued
by its supporters. In the case of pharmaceutical drugs, this includes the arguments that
patents in this industry in developing countries will: (i) induce a faster transfer of tech-
nology, (ii) increase inﬂows of FDI and, (iii) induce local innovation. It seems clear that
the worldwide extension of patent protection to pharmaceutical drugs will result in a
22 U.S. Trade Representative, 2000 Special 301 Report,a v ailable at http://www.ustr.gov/html/special.html.
23 Id. The Priority Watch List includes those countries that are being closely monitored for eventual re-
taliation. The 2001 Special 301 Report, available at http://www.ustr.gov/enforcement/special.pdf, identiﬁes
51 countries that deny adequate and effective protection of intellectual property or deny fair and equitable
market access to United States artists and industries that rely upon intellectual property protection. Sixteen
countries, including Argentina, were again on the Priority Watch List.
24 According to a personal communication to the author from the Asociaci´ on Industrial de Laboratorios
Farmace´ uticos Chilenos, many foreign companies stopped production in Chile after passage of the patent
law.
25 In conjunction with the World Health Organization (“WHO”) and other multilateral organizations includ-
ing the United Nations Industrial Development Corporation, the WTO could monitor carefully the effects of
patents for pharmaceutical drugs as they are introduced in developing countries. The introduction of patents
on pharmaceuticals has potentially important public health and industrial effects. Countries might need to
apply competition policies to soften potential abuses from patent monopoly but have little or no experience
in doing so.
26 See Claudio Frischtak, Harmonization versus Differentiation in International Property Rights Regime,
10 (2/3) INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT 200 (1995) (Brazil); A.S. Kirim, Recon-
sidering Patents and Economic Development: A Case Study of the Turkish Pharmaceutical Industry 13 (2)
WORLD DEVELOPMENT 219(1985); and Julio J. Nogu´ es, Patents and Pharmaceutical Drugs: Understanding
the Pressures on Developing Countries, 24(6) JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE 81(1990).
27 ∗∗See Chapter of this book (Correa), Part I, note 3.P1: FAW/FAW P2: FAW
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massive transfer of rents from pharmaceutical drug companies in developing countries
to international ones.28
B. Services
1. Privatization of Argentina’s Service Industries
During the 1990s, Argentina signiﬁcantly liberalized its service industries. The purpose
of this liberalization was to modernize the country after years during which inefﬁcient
government-owned companies held a monopoly of public services. As the quality of the
services they provided deteriorated at an alarming rate, these companies were subject
to increasing public criticism. When a new Government took over in mid-1989, the
efﬁciency of these enterprises had reached such low levels that the proposal to privatize
them faced no signiﬁcant opposition.
Asweepingprivatizationprogramwasimplementedoverthenextfewyears.Today,ten
years after this program was launched, the National Government has practically no stake
apart from minority shares in the numerous and economically signiﬁcant enterprises
producing goods and services that used to be publicly owned.29 Power generation and
distribution, communications and telecommunications, gas production and distribution,
wholesale and retail trade, banking and insurance, and numerous companies producing
tradable goods, such as petroleum, chemicals, and iron and steel, have been privatized.
Long-term private concessions have even been granted with respect to water companies,
port facilities, railroads, and roads.30
While a complete assessment of this privatization program is not available, it has had
positiveandnegativeaspects.Theperformanceoftheprivatizedcompanieshasgenerally
beenverygoodintermsofgrowthandqualityofservices.Duringtheperiod1993to1998,
the increase in GDP of the services producing sectors was 24 percent against 18 percent
in the goods-producing industries. But in the communications industry, where FDI is
signiﬁcant, the increase in value added during the same period was 46 percent. There is
no doubt that the liberalization of services explains the growing inﬂows of FDI which,
as a proportion of GDP, have ﬂuctuated between 1.2 percent in 1993 to 3.0 percent in
1997.
Most of the misgivings with the privatization process have to do with the prices at
which some of the privatized services are being offered. Some of these excessive prices
come from ﬂawed privatizations, including in some instances, the granting of monopoly
positions and in others, inadequate formulae for rate adjustments. Basic telecommu-
nications is an example of an initial grant of monopoly rights,31 while in many other
28 MorerecentlytheoutcryfrommanydevelopingcountriesledWTOMemberstoissuetheDohaDeclaration
on Public Health. Furthermore, a number of studies are questioning whether the TRIPS should not be made
moreﬂexible.Oneofthesestudies,entitledIntegratingIntellectualPropertyRightsandDevelopmentPolicy,
was published in 2002 by the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights established by Clare Short, U.K.
Minister of Development. This study is available at www.iprcommission.org.
29 The major exception is Banco Naci´ on which remains the largest single bank in terms of deposits.
30 The Provinces implemented important privatization programs, but some still own important companies.
FDIinﬂowshavealsobeenattractedbythesaleofprivately-ownedenterprises.Whilethisformofinvestment
has been prominent in the manufacturing sector, in some services where private ownership by nationals used
to be important, such as banking, FDI inﬂows have generally not been associated with the privatization
process.
31 The telecommunications industry has been opened to competition only recently, and new companies have
already started to contest the monopoly rights that were granted during the initial years to the privatized
basic telecommunications enterprises.P1: FAW/FAW P2: FAW
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Figure 2: Participation of Foreign Banks in Argentina’s Financial System
Source: Based on information provided to the author by the Central Bank.
service sectors the discontent arises from indexation formulas that have resulted in ser-
vice prices that in some cases are well above international standards. Finally, criticism
has also been raised against weak regulators. These regulatory deﬁciencies can also
be attributed to the Government’s lack of experience in exercising its new regulatory
functions and in managing new competition legislation. Certainly more research has
to be undertaken before deﬁnite conclusions can be drawn on these sensitive topics,




2. Estimating the Value of Concessions in Services
Argentina’s UR concessions in services were quite signiﬁcant and the discussion that
follows intends to provide an estimate of its economic importance. I ﬁrst note that for
the sectors and subsectors where concessions were bound, there are no limitations on
commercial presence or exceptions to the national treatment principle. This is the case
with respect to: (a) business services; (b) communication services; (c) construction ser-
vices; (d) distribution services; and, (e) tourism and travel services. Furthermore, in
banking and related services, while trans-border trade was not bound, commercial pres-
ence was bound. As shown in Figure 2, foreign banks came to hold almost half of total
deposits.32
Argentina’sconcessionswithrespecttotelecommunicationshavealsobeenimportant.
Fore xample, in the 1997 WTO agreement, Argentina bound commercial presence for
the most important forms of telecommunications services and its concessions have been
assessed as signiﬁcant.33 More recently, in June 2000, a Presidential Decree introduced
further deregulation measures. Argentina did not participate in the post-UR ﬁnancial
services negotiations, the reason being that its earlier concessions had been signiﬁcant.34
In sum, Argentina made signiﬁcant concessions in services sectors in the UR as well
as in more recent multilateral negotiations,. As a consequence, after decades of inward-
looking policies, during the 1990s trade in services and services-related FDI inﬂows
32 Following the devaluation of the peso in early 2002, this picture has changed.
33 Peter Cowhey and Mikhail Klimenko, The WTO Agreement and Telecommunications Policy Reforms,
Policy Research Working Paper 2601, World Bank (2001).
34 Several studies show that in the banking industry, Argentina was one of the few developing countries that
bound signiﬁcant concessions in the Uruguay Round. For example, it has been shown that the liberalization
index of Argentina for this industry is of a similar order of magnitude to those of the most liberal industrial
countries. See Aaditya Mattoo, Financial Services and the World Trade Organization: Liberalization Com-
mitments of the Developing and Transition Economies,P olicy Research Working Paper 2184, The World
Bank ( 1999).P1: FAW/FAW P2: FAW
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Figure 3: Trade in Services
Source: Ministry of Economy of Argentina.
blossomed. In what follows, we discuss trade effects and inward FDI ﬂows into the
services sector that were subject to the liberalization and privatization programs initiated
in the early 1990s.
3. Trade in Services
In its successive Balance of Payments Manuals, of which the latest is the Fifth Edition
(“BPM5”). the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) has recommended disaggregation
of statistics on trade in services. In 1999, the Government of Argentina, which may be
one of the few developing countries with complete and revised statistics on services
trade,35 published revised balance of payments accounts following the methodological
guidelinesindicatedinBMP5.Thenewseriesstartin1992andthereforeprovidevaluable
information on some of the trade effects following the liberalization of the services
industries. What do these ﬁgures show?
Figure 3 shows exports, imports and trade balances for the services categories listed
in BMP5. The ﬁgure shows a trade deﬁcit increasing from $2.5 billion in 1992 to $4.3
billion in 1998.36 This is in line with other Latin American countries, and contrasts with
some Asian economies where trade in services, and exports in particular, is growing
faster than trade in goods.
A second aspect worth noting is that this growing deﬁcit is not the result of one
or two services showing some unusual trade behavior, but the outcome of a number
of categories that deteriorated during the 1990s. The sharpest declines occurred in the
following accounts: (i) insurance and reinsurance (where the deﬁcit increased by ten
times), (ii) entrepreneurial services, (iii) ﬁnancial services and, (iv) royalties. These
statistics appear to show quite clearly that at the level of aggregation of the accounts
indicated in BMP5, Argentina does not have comparative advantage in services. As we
shall see, the picture is even worse if we add commercial presence as a mode of supply,
as FDI inﬂows have grown rapidly.
One ﬁnal comment. The work program leading to the publication of revised balance
of payments accounts in 1999 also uncovered serious errors of measurement. There is no
singleservicesaccountthatwasbeingmeasuredwithreasonableaccuracyandthelargest
errors appeared on the import side. For example, the previous ﬁgures underestimated
servicesimportsby$893millionin1992andby$2.3billionin1998.ClearlyArgentina’s
participation in the UR services negotiations was based on rather poor statistics, and it
35 Fewd eveloping countries, but most industrial countries, show entries on exports and imports for all
the service categories listed in BMP5. See Obie Whichard, Measurement, Classiﬁcation, and Reporting of
Services Activities: An International Perspective,W orld Bank (1999).
36 Because of the recession that started in 1999, the deﬁcit in services trade also declined somewhat in that
year.P1: FAW/FAW P2: FAW
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is likely that the accuracy of ofﬁcial statistics is also a serious problem for many other
developing countries.
4. Services-Related Inﬂows of FDI
Trade statistics say nothing about delivery of services under Mode Three (commercial
presence) but in Argentina and other developing countries this appears to be the most
signiﬁcant source of supply. At most, balance of payments statistics represent a rough
proxyofsomeofthetradeﬂowsunderModeOne(cross-border).Again,theworkleading
to the publication of Argentina’s revised balance of payments accounts in 1999 included
a major effort to collect data on FDI. These statistics show the growth of inward FDI by
economic sector and by country of origin for both stocks and proﬁts/dividends.37 What
do these statistics show?
Following the liberalization of Argentina’s trade and capital accounts in the early
1990s, inﬂows of FDI grew rapidly. In addition to the concessions given in the UR, the
incentives for FDI were enhanced by Argentina’s very open capital system and the very
liberal treatment given to foreign capital. Most FDI inﬂows come under the umbrella
of bilateral investment treaties that generally impose no restrictions in terms of sectors,
percentage ownership, capital and proﬁt remittances, or employment conditions.38
Between 1992 and 1998, the stock of FDI increased from $15.8 billion to $46.9
billions.39 Table2provides a breakdown of this stock and the associated proﬁts and
dividends by economic sector. We see here that proﬁts accruing to FDI enterprises in the
services sectors jumped from $243 million in 1992, to $1.6 billion in 1998.
Over this period, the service category that has generated the most important ﬂow
of FDI proﬁts has been electricity, gas and water, followed by distribution services.
Figure 4 shows the accumulated ﬂows of FDI for the period 1992 to 1998 by coun-
try of origin. As expected, Europe (mainly the Netherlands, Spain, France, and the
United Kingdom), and the United States are the main sources of FDI inﬂows. Investors




ing a rough estimate of the signiﬁcance of these concessions, that commercial presence
wasasigniﬁcant factor attracting FDI. In the UR Argentina bound commercial presence
in all of the subcategories of the following services headings of the UR list where con-
cessions were given: (i) business services, (ii) communication and telecommunications
services, (iii) construction and engineering services, (iv) distribution services, (iv) ﬁ-
nancial services except insurance and reinsurance and, (v) tourism and travel.40 Table 3
shows the inﬂows of FDI and associated proﬁts classiﬁed according to Argentina’s list
37 MINISTRY OF ECONOMY OF ARGENTINA,L A INVERSI´ ON EXTRANJERA DIRECTA EN ARGENTINA: 1992–1998.
Direcci´ on de Nacional de Cuentas Internacionales, Ministry of Economy of Argentina: 1999.
38 These treaties generally provide that investment-related disputes would be submitted to the International
Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes.
39 Because of the sale of the remaining government shares in YPF (Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales), the
largest petroleum company in Argentina, FDI inﬂows in 1999 reached the record level of $23.2 billion
dollars. This raised the accumulated stock of FDI at the end of that year to $70.1 billion, more than twelve
times higher than in 1992. Because of the unusual size of the YPF transaction, the comments in this part are
focused on FDI inﬂows during the period 1992 to 1998.
40 Ia mg rateful to the Direcci´ on Nacional de Cuentas Internacionales of the Ministry of Economy for
providing the data for Table 3.P1: FAW/FAW P2: FAW
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Table2: Stock and Proﬁts of FDI by Economic Sector Argentina 1992–1998
(U.S.$million)
Sector 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
I- Stock 17,392 22,319 27,828 32,609 40,929 46,858
A-Goods 8,654 9,354 11,334 13,933 17,159 20,939 22,620
Petroleum 2,634 2,654 3,072 3,504 4,312 4,650 5,159
Mining 83 60 80 113 388 644 912
Manufacturing 5,937 6,640 8,182 10,316 12,459 15,645 16,549
B-Services 7,168 8,578 10,985 13,895 15,450 19,990 24,238
Elec., Gas, Water 2,291 3,229 3,691 4,876 5,286 6,567 7,526
Distribution 576 624 984 1,307 1,850 1,985 2,500
Communications 1,947 1,997 2,397 2,703 3,109 3,771 3,997
Banks 1,393 1,748 1,955 2,528 3,001 4,507 5,671
Others 961 980 1,957 2,481 2,205 3,161 4,544
II-Proﬁts 1,133 1,678 1,820 1,893 1,762 2,331 2,465
A-Goods 890 873 1,279 882 909 1,203 908
Petroleum 349 290 430 409 451 363 209
Mining −1 −10 −3 −4 −12 −4 −4
Manufacturing 452 593 852 477 470 844 703
B-Services 243 805 541 1,011 853 1,128 1.557
Elec., Gas, Water −13 196 297 422 377 504 563
Distribution 133 163 294 213 189 150 204
Communications 91 92 34 178 113 217 291
Banks 71 204 −151 164 52 122 229
Others 51 149 68 34 122 135 270














Figure 4: Stock of FDI by Country of Origin, Argentina 1998.
Source: Ministry of Economy of Argentina. (1999).
of concessions in the UR41 for the categories where commercial presence was bound.
According to these ﬁgures, the annual value of concessions given by Argentina to its
trading partners was equivalent to $917 million of proﬁts in 1998.
41 Julio J. Nogu´ es, La Institucionalizaci´ on de la Globalizaci´ on,i nL A GLOBALIZACI´ ON Y LA ARGENTINA,
CONSEJO EMPRESARIO ARGENTINO (Juan De Pablo, Rudiger Dornbusch and Julio J. Nogu´ es eds. 2001) at
103.P1: FAW/FAW P2: FAW
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Table3: Stocks and Proﬁts of FDI by Economic Sector, Argentina 1992, 1995 and 1998
(U.S.$ thousand)
STOCK PROFITS
Type of Service 1992 1995 1998 1992 1995 1998
Entrepreneurial 4,694 6,000 16,347 818 480 1,120
Post Ofﬁce Mail 0 0 310,035 0 0 22,695
Telecommunications 1,947,284 2,618,745 2,553,150 180,482 261,746 342,692
T,V, and Cable 0 50,040 1,474,643 0 5,022 47,788
Construction 171,171 159,043 233,503 14,073 23,637 39,367
Wholesale Trade 292,160 349,782 85,985 79,940 50,168 −31,999
Retail Trade 146,053 485,349 1,689,820 34,675 90,226 146,165
Banks 1,393,000 2,528,000 5,670,939 71,000 163,000 229,000
Other Finance 91,510 156,157 460,482 34,473 11,703 90,918
Hotel and Restaurants 53,519 93,118 96,141 6,921 5,340 11,620
Other Transport 517 34,213 82,998 111 0 17,195




Electricity, Gas and Water 2,304,057 4,787,536 8,230,872 −11,916 422,666 568,319
Community Services 9,196 12,381 21,350 4958 1,685 6,818
Health 0 35,000 209,054 0 2,800 5,110
Transport 45,980 166,041 213,936 −71,662 −46,438 −42,130
Total 2,359,233 5,000,958 8,675,212 −78,620 380,713 538,117
Source: Direcci´ on de Nacional de Cuentas Internacionales, Ministry of Economy of Argentina.
Note: Some of the ﬁgures in this table do not exactly match those in Table 2 because they come from a
different source.
C. Trade in Goods
1. Manufacturing
Intheareaoftradeingoods,probablythemostsigniﬁcantconcessiongivenbyArgentina
in the UR was the binding of the maximum tariff rate at 35 percent for all goods.
Previously, only seventeen percent of Argentina’s tariff lines were bound.42 In 1985/86,
importswerecontrolledbyveryhightariffsandsurchargesthatputthesimpleaveragead
valorem rate at 39 percent. In contrast, the average MERCOSUR common external tariff
(“CET”) now stands at around thirteen percent.43 Likewise, while in 1986, Argentina
required advance import licenses for 47 percent of its tariff lines, this requirement no
longer existed, at least until 2002.44 However, other important non-tariff barriers still
exist, such as those protecting the automobile sector as well as several antidumping
measures.45
As a consequence of this trade liberalization program and other structural reforms,
Argentina’s trade grew quite signiﬁcantly during the 1990s. In particular, the value of
imports, that had stood at $4.3 billion in 1989, increased to $25.5 billion in 1999. Most
42 Finger, Ingco, and Reincke, supra note 4, at 24.
43 JULIO BERLINSKI,E L SISTEMA DE INCENTIVOS EN ARGENTINA (1998).
44 Following the devaluation of early 2002, foreign exchange controls have been reinstituted.
45 During 2001 increasing macroeconomic divergence from Argentina’s attempt to sustain convertibility in
the presence of a rapidly depreciating Brazilian “real” led to the implementation of an important number of
departures from the CET, particularly by Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay.P1: FAW/FAW P2: FAW
KI134-Macrory ki134-65.tex September 14, 2004 0:52
2384 ARGENTINA
of these imports come from industrialized countries. Of particular interest is the fact that
imports of capital goods from OECD countries increased from $745 million in 1989 to
$4.2 billion in 1999.
2. Agriculture
Although one of the original objectives of the Uruguay Round was the “...reduction
of import barriers...” to agricultural trade,46 this goal was not met. The inefﬁcient
agricultural producers did not bind concessions of signiﬁcant economic value in any of
the major negotiating areas.
It is true that one of the advances achieved in the UR agricultural negotiations was
the tarifﬁcation of non-tariff barriers, but even this process has been criticized as “dirty”
in the sense that the base tariffs declared to the WTO were much higher than they were
supposed to be. For example, the following ad valorem tariffs were notiﬁed by the EU
as its UR base rates: rice 361 percent, wheat 156 percent, sugar 297 percent, meat 125
percent and dairy products 288 percent.47 The sheer magnitude of these numbers is a
clear indication of how strong some anti-globalization forces are in industrial countries.
Even after reduction of many of these tariffs by 36 percent, which was the obligation
undertaken by developed countries in the UR, many agricultural products were protected
at a higher level than before the UR.48
Three policies were supposed to reduce agricultural protection by the OECD coun-
tries:(i)thereductionoftariffs,(ii)thebindingoftariffsattheendoftheimplementation
period, and (iii) minimum access commitments. In spite of these important opportuni-
ties for liberalization, the conclusion of the assessment of the UR results is that there is
“...markedly little liberalization for most products in most countries....”49 The Agree-
ment on Agriculture appears to be somewhat stronger with respect to the reduction of
export subsidies, but overall there has been little progress and in some instances, the
results have been retrogressive.50
Since the completion of the UR, OECD governmental assistance to agriculture has
continued to rise. This assistance reached $336 billion in 1997 and $362 billion in 1998.
This increase is partially explained by the reduction of international commodity prices,
many of which continued to decline in 1999.51
The disappointing results of the agricultural negotiations helps to explain some trade
developments.Traditionally,Argentinamaintainedanoveralltradesurpluswithcountries
in the EU but during the 1990s this surplus shifted to systematic deﬁcits. The size of
these deﬁcits has been inﬂuenced by Argentina’s liberalization steps as well as by the
continued resistance by the EU to liberalize its agricultural policies.
D. Summing-up
ForA r gentina, the UR resulted in an important imbalance between the concessions that
it made and those that it received from OECD countries. First, at the end of the transition
46 GATT Secretariat, The Uruguay Round Ministerial Declaration (1986).
47 DaleHathawayandMerlindaIngco,AgriculturalLiberalizationandtheUruguayRound,inT HEURUGUAY
ROUND AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIESPAGES 30–58 (Will Martin and L. Alan Winters eds. 1995).
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Nogu´ es, supranote 41, at 136.
51 OECD, AGRICULTURAL POLICIES IN OECD COUNTRIES:M ONITORING AND EVALUATION (This is a yearly
report and the reader should consult the volumes for 2001 and 2002).P1: FAW/FAW P2: FAW
KI134-Macrory ki134-65.tex September 14, 2004 0:52
ARGENTINA 2385
period, rents of $425 million per year may have been transferred from domestic to
international pharmaceutical companies in developed countries. Second, liberalization
of trans-border ﬂows was accompanied by a doubling of the services trade deﬁcit as
imports, mostly from industrial countries, increased by 62 percent between 1992 and
1998. Third, in the service sectors where Argentina bound commercial presence in the
UR, the proﬁts of FDI ﬁrms, the majority of which are of OECD origin, reached $917
million in 1998. During these years, the stock of FDI in these sectors tripled. Fourth,
Argentina’stradeliberalizationalsoresultedinamorethantenfoldincreaseintheannual
import bill of capital goods from OECD countries. In short, the concessions given by
Argentina in the UR have provided important beneﬁts to foreign companies from the
industrialized countries.
On the receiving side, Argentina beneﬁted from tariff reductions in manufactured
goods, but as we have seen, it also gave important concessions in these products. As to
the negotiations in agriculture, the outcome is certainly not “liberalization”.
Summingup,accordingtothemercantilistequationbywhichtheresultsofmultilateral
trade negotiations are assessed, Argentina was a big loser in the UR. This as I argue in
the next part, particularly the results of the agricultural negotiations, has had serious
negative economic consequences for the country.
IV. Costs of Agricultural Protectionism for Argentina
Argentina’s agricultural and agro-industrial exports represent around ﬁfty percent of its
total exports of goods. It is not surprising, therefore, that the damage that agricultural
protectionism inﬂicts on Argentina is in the billions of dollars. The social impact is
also signiﬁcant because, while some OECD agricultural producers receive as much as
$35,000 dollars of subsidy per year,52 poverty levels in the countryside of Argentina, as
well as migration from rural to urban areas, have continued to rise. In a signiﬁcant way,
rural poverty in Argentina is the mirror image of the riches in the OECD countries.
A. Agricultural Protectionism and Financial Costs
The macroeconomic impact of agricultural protection is also signiﬁcant. Had the UR
Agreement on Agriculture resulted in an increase in Argentina’s agriculture exports of
say $5 billion, the country’s debt service ratio would be lower. This, as I argue below,
would reduce the level of country risk and the structure of domestic interest rates.
Fore xample, between 1990 and 1998 Argentina’s total exports to the EU increased
by only 21 percent. This contrasts with the country’s performance of total exports and
exports of primary products plus foodstuffs that during the same period increased by
112 percent and 92 percent respectively.53 As discussed earlier, with this performance,
the traditional trade surplus that Argentina used to have with these countries shifted to a
systematic deﬁcit.
The imbalance is important; and is likely to have negative macroeconomic effects that
go well beyond the direct trade and production effects. To understand this, recall that
Argentina is a country with an open capital account and with free capital movements
up to the end of 2001. Therefore, since the early 1990s its structure of interest rates
has been determined by international risk-free rates plus a domestic risk factor. Since
52 Id., 2001.
53 Nogu´ es, supra note 41, at 185.P1: FAW/FAW P2: FAW
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Figure 5: Country Risk and Interannual GDP growth rate
Source: JulioJ.Nogu´ esandMartinGrandes,CountryRisk:Contagion,DeﬁcitsorPoliticalNoise,
IV(1) JOURNAL OF AAPPLIED ECONOMICS 125 (2001).
the national Government is by far the major borrower in international markets, the risk
implicit in its bonds is a major determinant of domestic interest rates. When foreign
investors conclude that the economic outlook of the country is likely to improve, they
bring capital into the country, for example by increasing their demand for Government
bonds. When this happens, the increase in bond prices result in a reduction in the level of
country risk as measured by the interest spreads between domestic and risk-free bonds.
In fact, as Figure 5 shows, the level of country risk is inversely correlated with short term
economic cycles.
This ﬁgure shows year-on-year variation in quarterly GDP and the spread between
the returns of Argentina’s sovereign bonds and the comparable US Treasury bond. What
determines this spread, usually known as the country risk factor? In recent empirical
research, this risk has been found to be a function of a number of economic and political
variables, including contagion effects from Mexico’s ﬁnancial markets, growth expecta-
tions, ﬁscal deﬁcits, political noise effects, and solvency indicators such as debt service
to exports.54 This last variable helps to understand how the level of exports may have
macroeconomic effects through ﬁnancial variables. Our ﬁndings show that a one percent
permanent increase in this variable increases country risk by 0.63 percent. With these
results we can simulate what would be the level of country risk for different levels of
additional exports.
This exercise is based on recent ﬁndings based on a computable general equilibrium
model which suggests that the dismantling of OECD agricultural protectionism could
have increased Argentina’s exports by between 25 percent and 100 percent.55 Based
on these simulations and on the elasticity of country risk with respect to debt service to
exportratio,wecanconcludethathadthelevelofexportsin2000been25percenthigher,
the country risk would had been ten percent lower. If lower agricultural protectionism
54 Julio J. Nogu´ es and Martin Grandes, Country Risk: Contagion, Deﬁcits or Political Noise, IV(1) JOURNAL
OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 125 (2001).
55 CARLOS S´ ANCHEZ AND GABRIEL CASABURI,L AS DISTORSIONES DE LOS MERCADOS MUNDIALES DE
ALIMENTOS Y SU IMPACTO EN LA ARGENTINA (2001).P1: FAW/FAW P2: FAW
KI134-Macrory ki134-65.tex September 14, 2004 0:52
ARGENTINA 2387
had enabled Argentina to increase its total exports by ﬁfty percent, the level of country
risk would had been 33 percent lower.
Summing-up, in addition to the traditional static welfare losses from agricultural
protectionism, the analysis of this part indicates that because agricultural protectionism
also increases interest rates in efﬁcient producer countries like Argentina, the cost of this
protectionism is higher than what has been traditionally assumed. For example for 2000,
the average country risk faced by Argentina’ domestic residents was 672 basis points.56
Had Argentina faced open international agricultural markets, its country risk would had
been much lower, saving domestic debtors billions of dollars in interest costs.
B. Other Costs of Agricultural Protectionism
Ih avea r gued elsewhere that the higher structure of interest rates caused by higher
country risk implies lower growth.57 In addition, not only the level but also the policies
usedtoimplementthisprotectionismcreateadditionalcostsforacountrylikeArgentina.
This occurs because international price ﬂuctuations are accentuated by the policies of
industrialized countries that shelter their domestic farmers from these ﬂuctuations. By
increasing the instability of Argentina’s terms of trade, the slower growth resulting from
higher country risk occurs along a path of widened business cycles.
On a related matter, I hope that this discussion has illustrated the importance of
the Marrakesh mandate for the achievement of greater coherence between international
ﬁnancial organizations like the IMF and the World Bank, on the one hand, and the
WTO on the other.58 As long as agricultural protectionism in industrialized countries
continues to remain at the very high level of the last decade, there will remain clear
opportunitiesforincreasingthe“coherence”betweeninternationalﬁnancialmarketsand
the multilateral trading system. A signiﬁcant decline of agricultural protectionism would
facilitate repayment of foreign debt and strengthen the international ﬁnancial system.
C. Summing-up with a Proposal
This discussion has shown that the increased ﬁnancial costs faced by countries that are
efﬁcient producers as a consequence of protectionism on the part of industrial countries
is higher and sometimes much higher than usually thought. Additional dynamic costs
of these policies are caused by slower growth rates and magniﬁed business cycles. Both
the static and dynamic economic costs faced by Argentina and other efﬁcient developing
country producers that can be attributed to agricultural protectionism by industrialized
countries are shamefully high.
Unfortunately, there is every indication that this protectionism is becoming more en-
trenched.59 My proposal is for the existing Working Group on Trade, Debt and Finance
in the WTO to be transformed into a negotiating Body. It is quite incredible that issues
56 Data provided by Direcci´ on de Cuentas Internacionales of the Ministry of Economy.
57 Nogu´ es and Grandes, supra note 54.
58 Declaration on the Contribution of the World Trade Organization to Achieving Greater Coherence in
Global Economic Policy making,i nT HE LEGAL TEXTS:T HE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTI-
LATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (1999) at 386.
59 The passage of the US Farm Bill of 2002 and the 2002 proposal by the EC to reform the Common
Agricultural Policy support this view. A preliminary analysis of these proposals appears in the recent report
issued by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund entitled Market Access and Developing
Country Exports-Selected Issues,a v ailable at www.worldbank.org.P1: FAW/FAW P2: FAW
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like trade and environment have become negotiating topics and yet the strong link be-
tween trade and debt still remains on the sidelines of the multilateral trade negotiations.
Including trade and debt as a negotiating topic would change the structure of incentives
as it would make more visible the costs of agricultural protectionism and would trigger
a debate on who should pay for it.
V. Regional Trade Negotiations between MERCOSUR and the EU
As a member of MERCOSUR, Argentina is participating in several regional trade ne-
gotiations, including those with the Andean Group, with the United States (in the Free
Trade Agreement of the Americas (“FTAA”), and with the EU. At the time of drafting
this chapter (the end of 2001), only the negotiations with the EU had advanced to a stage
where some relevant comments on trade negotiating strategies can be offered. The nego-
tiations with the United States had not yet started, and the agenda of the FTAA indicated
that these would start in late 2002. Only a preliminary exchange of documents had taken
place with the Andean Group, where the goal is a free trade agreement in goods.
A. Background
InDecember,1995,MERCOSURandtheEUsignedaninterregionalcooperationagree-
ment that seeks to create a free trade zone. Since then, both regions have held a number
of meetings, and in 1999 the Bi-Regional Negotiating EU/MERCOSUR Committee
(“BNC”) initiated the negotiations. By the end of 2001 the BNC had already met six
times, most recently in early July 2001 in Montevideo and in Brussels in late October
2001.
Theﬁrstthreemeetingsdealtessentiallywiththeexchangeofinformation.Thefourth
meeting of the BNC (“BNC IV”) held in Brussels, was more substantive in character.
Here MERCOSUR indicated that it was seeking a free trade agreement. Essentially,
the MERCOSUR was expressing its aim that the Common Agricultural Policy (“CAP”)
should not be an obstacle to the establishment of a free trade agreement. In turn, the EU
expressed that it was planning to present to MERCOSUR a concrete offer and demand
for market access in the next BNC meeting. This proposal would later prove to be far
from a free trade agreement.
B. Differing Negotiating Goals and Strategies
The MERCOSUR document, entitled “Modalities for the Tariff Negotiations”, de-
manded, in line with its goal of establishing a free trade area, that “...it is necessary to
establish a reference tariff on the basis of which liberalization would be negotiated...”.
It further stated that “...speciﬁc tariffs, mixed tariffs and any other type of tariffs should
be transformed into an ad valorem equivalent that for negotiation purposes would be the
maximum reference tariff.... ” MERCOSUR offered to reduce its common external tar-
iff (“CET”), which is deﬁned on an ad valorem basis, plus any modiﬁcations introduced
after its establishment in 1994 to zero over a ten year period, the same period proposed
by the EU. Of course, there would be a list of exceptions for sensitive products.
Obviously, the goal of MERCOSUR’s demand for ad valorem tarifﬁcation was to en-
surethatthemanytrademeasuresprotectingEUagriculturalandagro-industrialproducts
shouldnotbeanimpedimenttothenegotiations.Inessence,byproposingtobasemarket
access negotiations on transparent equivalent ad valorem tariffs and to negotiate theirP1: FAW/FAW P2: FAW
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elimination over a ten year period, MERCOSUR was offering full reciprocity. In fact as
we shall see, it was in effect offering more as it was not refusing to negotiate other issues
put on the table by the EU, some of which appear to be of doubtful economic interest to
the region.
In contrast, the EU never agreed to negotiate on the basis of equivalent ad valorem
tariffs.ItarguedthatthiswouldundercuttheCAP,withrespecttowhichitisonlyprepared
to negotiate in a multilateral round (which, as I argue below when discussing the Doha
Declaration, is unlikely to occur in a signiﬁcant way). In response, MERCOSUR argued
that its goal was to put the regional negotiations on an equal footing for both sides, and
not to challenge the CAP. In fact, so far the EU strategy appears to have been to negotiate
speciﬁc elements of the CAP on a product-by-product basis. The differences between
the MERCOSUR proposal and that of the EU are signiﬁcant.
C. The EU Proposal
The EU presented its proposal at the July 2001 BNC meeting,. In contrast to MER-
COSUR’s offer for a free trade agreement,it is difﬁcult to see how the EU offer could
have been more mercantilist. While the EU proposed that both sides should eliminate ad
valorem tariffs over a period of ten years, this proposal hides an important imbalance in
market access concessions, as now explained:
 The EU proposal would ensure free access to the MERCOSUR market for EU
manufacturedproducts,themostprotectedsectoroftheeconomiesoftheregion,
in exchange for access to what is already a very open market in the EU.
 Thepictureisverydifferentwithrespecttoagriculturalandagro-industrialprod-
ucts. Except for a few countervailing measures, agricultural protection in MER-
COSUR is also based on ad valorem tariffs. The EU proposal to dismantle ad
valorem tariffs would also provide a high degree of access to the MERCOSUR
market for EU agricultural products. It would not however provide much access
for MERCOSUR agricultural and agro-industrial products to the EU. In addi-
tion to ad valorem tariffs, the EU imposes seasonal tariffs, speciﬁc-rate tariffs,
and mixed tariffs, and it also employs export subsidies, budget support, tariff
escalation, special agricultural safeguards and quotas.60 The EU has offered to
dismantle only the ad valorem tariffs, which would leave a very high degree of
protection in place, particularly for products where MERCOSUR has compara-
tive advantage.
 To compoundtheproblem,theEUagriculturalandagro-industrypoliciesprovide
a high degree of protection administered in a very non-transparent way. It could
take the MERCOSUR negotiators several months to gain detailed knowledge of
this protection and then they will be faced with the difﬁculty of deciding how
much MERCOSUR should “pay” the EU to eliminate the ad valorem tariff or
other components of its agricultural protection? The complexity of this problem
increaseswhenapproachedonaproduct-by-productbasis.Differentproductsare
protected by different measures in the EU, but in general ad valorem tariffs do
not provide the bulk of protection to agricultural products.61
60 Some products of signiﬁcant export value for MERCOSUR, such as beef, also face sanitary and phy-
tosanitary barriers, some of which appear to be supported by weak scientiﬁc evidence.
61 The nature of the complexity of EU agricultural protectionism can be illustrated by two examples. The
ﬁrst is fruits such as pears, apples, and oranges. For speciﬁc periods of the year classiﬁed by month orP1: FAW/FAW P2: FAW
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 Furthermore, in contrast to the initial MERCOSUR proposal that covered all
products, the EU proposal excludes around one thousand tariff lines of which
781 are products of great export interest for Argentina. Estimates of the ad
valorem equivalent by the Secretariat of Trade with respect to a sample of the
excluded products show a high average level of protection of these products of
36 percent, with a maximum of 463 percent. Exclusion of these products signif-
icantly reduces the MERCOSUR export potential of a trade agreement with the
EU.
 In addition to full access to the MERCOSUR markets for goods, the EU is de-
manding: (i) full reciprocity in textiles and footwear, (ii) standstill and rollback,
(iii)forﬁsheriesproducts,liberalizationwouldtakeintoaccount“accesstowater
resources”,(iv)dutiesonwinewouldbeabolishedintheframeworkofaseparate
agreement including “protection of geographical indications and traditional ex-
pressions.” In Argentina textiles and footwear are two “sensitive” labor-intensive
sectors. Standstill (no new measures to be introduced) and rollback (of import
measures to some speciﬁed date) have not been discussed in detail but given
the nature of the CAP, there is no way that a realistic rollback by the EU could
offer gains in market access that would match a similar reform by MERCOSUR.
Details of the proposal on access to water resources and geographical indications
have not been speciﬁed, but Argentina’s national ﬁshing ﬂeet is not signiﬁcant
and, although Argentina has good wines, it has not developed signiﬁcant ge-
ographical indications, so that in these areas too, it may be the loser. In sum,
reciprocal concessions in these areas of the expanded negotiating agenda appear
to have greater commercial value for the EU.
 The EU has also demanded negotiations on government procurement and ser-
vices. In both areas, the EU seeks a high degree of access to the MERCOSUR
markets. In services, for example, it seeks access to all markets except audio-
visual services, national maritime cabotage and air transport services. The pro-
posal clariﬁes that the “right of commercial presence” does “...not extend to
seekingortakingemploymentinthelabormarketorconferarightofaccesstothe
labor market of another party.” 62 Regarding government procurement, the pre-
sumption is that EU multinationals are better positioned to sell to MERCOSUR
governments than vice versa.
D. Summary
With the available information it is risky to forecast where the regional negotiations
between MERCOSUR and the EU will end. One general comment is that the outcome
will not be the broad free trade agreement that MERCOSUR countries initially sought.
A second general comment is that in agriculture, the outcome will most likely be one of
very limited liberalization by the EU. If so, the economic results of these negotiations
consecutive months, fruits are protected by ad valorem and speciﬁc tariffs. Given the objective of protecting
farm incomes, the EU speciﬁc tariffs vary inversely with the level of import prices. The result of this is that
for pears for example, there are ten rates varying between zero and ten percent. In addition, speciﬁc tariffs
also vary by time of the year so that the number of possible combinations protecting pears is very high. In
simulations performed by Argentina’s Secretariat of Trade, the EU ad valorem tariff equivalent, including
the effects of speciﬁc tariffs, protecting pears varies between zero and 77 percent.
62 European Union Working Text: Trade in Services, EU draft, July 2, 2001.P1: FAW/FAW P2: FAW
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will be of limited value for Argentina. Further discussions will have to take place before
a comprehensive assessment can be made of the net beneﬁts that Argentina might derive
from a MERCOSUR-EU trade agreement.
VI. Argentina’s Prospects in a New Multilateral Trade Round
Argentina failed to defend its interests effectively at the WTO Ministerial Meeting held
in Doha in November, 2001. Having been taken in by the UR Agreement on Agriculture,
including the dirty tarifﬁcation practiced by industrial countries, Argentina should had
gonetoDohapreparedtosaynotoanewmultilateralround.Theprospectofstillanother
negotiation where little agricultural trade liberalization is expected to take place worsens
thedevelopmentprospectsofthecountry.IncontrasttotheweaknessshownbyArgentina,
the EU hinted at Doha that unless speciﬁc language on agriculture was included in the
Ministerial Declaration, it was ready to say no to a new round. In particular, the EU went
to Doha prepared to stand ﬁrm on its objective not to allow speciﬁc quantitative targets
for agricultural liberalization. For example, the EU strongly objected to the language
that suggested an agreement to dismantle export subsidies, and in the end its threats
prevailed.
There is little in the Doha Ministerial Declaration to suggest that signiﬁcant lib-
eralization of the agricultural protectionism practiced by industrial countries will be
achieved. The statement in the Declaration that the negotiations should aim to achieve
“...substantial improvements in market access; reductions of, with the view to phasing
out, all forms of export subsidies; and substantial reductions in trade distorting domes-
tic support...” 63 is not substantially different from the language of the UR Ministerial
Declaration that promised signiﬁcant reductions in import protection. As noted above,
OECD agricultural protectionism today is about the same if not higher than what it was
before the conclusion of the UR.
The outcome of the new WTO negotiations will depend on the ability of different
countries to obtain their goals. Unfortunately, the available evidence suggests that the
EUandJapanwillmostlikelyprevail.ThesecountriesnotonlyconvincedotherMembers
to exclude quantitative targets for agricultural trade liberalization from the Ministerial
Declaration, but also succeeded in including the statement that “...non-trade concerns
will be taken into account in the negotiations.... ” 64 Another statement included at the
behest of the developed countries was that “...under WTO rules, no country should
be prevented from taking measures for the protection of human, animal or plant life or
health, or of the environment at the levels it considers appropriate...”65 This statement
refer to sanitary and phytosanitary standards. Emerging evidence suggests that these
standards are being used with protectionist intent.66
Argentina went to Doha without having prepared a negotiating strategy. Neither the
MinisterofForeignAffairs,thecountry’schiefnegotiator,noranyotherministerattended
the meeting. Its deputy chief negotiator arrived late. In contrast to the lack of political
63 World Trade Organization, Doha Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, ¶13. The text of the
Declaration is provided in the Appendix to this book.
64 Id.
65 Id., ¶6.
66 See,e.g., John Wilson, Standards, Trade, and Development: What is Known and What do We Need to
Know, presented at the World Bank Seminar on Informing the Doha Process: New Research for Developing
Countries, Cairo, Egypt, May 20–21, 2002.P1: FAW/FAW P2: FAW
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importance given to this meeting by Argentina, other developing countries like Brazil
andIndiaattendedwithclearobjectivesandastrategythatapparentlyincludedsayingno
to a new round if they did not achieve minimum goals. Thus, for example, Brazil played
ak ey role in the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health. Likewise,
in his opening statements, India’s Minister of Commerce and Industry, its chief trade
negotiator, stated that the “...draft Ministerial Declaration is neither fair nor just to
the viewpoint of many developing countries...It is a negation of all that was said by
a signiﬁcant number of developing countries and least developing countries....”67 It is
therefore not surprising that India played a key role with respect to the Doha Ministerial
Declaration on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns.68
In my view, Argentina should had prepared a negotiating strategy that at a minimum
included the threat of not supporting a new round if speciﬁc agricultural commitments
were not included in the Ministerial Declaration. If it had done so, the WTO Members
would have witnessed a confrontation between rich protectionist countries and poor but
efﬁcient developing countries. I believe this would have beneﬁted Argentina in much the
same way as standing ﬁrm proved to be a successful strategy for other industrialized and
developing countries. As things stand, Argentina is headed towards another multilateral
negotiationthatwillmostlikelyresultinanunbalancedoutcomeandadditionalnetcosts
to the country. Obviously this can still be corrected during the negotiations but for this
to happen, Argentina must develop an aggressive strategy.
VII. Concluding Remarks
At the time of the UR, Argentina and many other developing countries that implemented
inward-looking policies for decades, had to show to the globalizing world that they were
doing their homework. For many reforming countries, the UR was an instrument to lock-
in unilateral liberalization policies while for industrial countries, it was an agreement to
sell and export increased quantities. In part because of this but also to a signiﬁcant extent
because Argentina lacked a negotiating strategy, it came out of the round with a clear
imbalance between the concessions it gave and those that it received.
The imbalance for Argentina is signiﬁcant and probably one of the most important of
the UR, and I have shown that this outcome entailed very high costs to the country. In
spite of this, Argentina has apparently not learned the lesson that in order to increase the
likelihood of success in international trade negotiations, it is crucial to draft a strategy
and to have the capacity and strength to implement it. My argument in support of this
statement comes from Doha. I have presented evidence supporting the argument that
in contrast to other industrial and developing countries, Argentina participated in the
Doha Ministerial Meeting ready to agree to any language for the agricultural negotia-
tions or, for that matter, on any other topic. Its general stance has been and continues
to be that any negotiation, irrespective of its outcome, is better than no negotiation.
As long as the Government fails to develop a strategy, the country will continue to
sign unbalanced negotiating outcomes and as a consequence, will sacriﬁce development
opportunities.
Finally,thefactthatagriculturalprotectionisminOECDcountriesremainsirresponsi-
bly high is a clear sign of the lack of coherence between the international trading system
67 World Trade Organization, Statement by India, WT/MIN(01)/ST/10, (2001).
68 WT/MIN(01)/17.P1: FAW/FAW P2: FAW
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and the international ﬁnancial markets. This link has to be studied more carefully with
the expectation that more precise and complete awareness of the ﬁnancial costs of agri-
cultural protectionism will add to the pressures for liberalizing OECD markets during
the Doha Development Round. My concrete suggestion is to transform the Working
Group on Trade, Finance and Debt into a negotiating group before the conclusion of this
round.P1: FAW/FAW P2: FAW
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